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I. Introduction
States, like people, have an instinct to protect themselves when in a life-and-death
struggle. The recognition of a state of emergency, or of siege, in the domestic legal
order, dates back to at least Roman times. Today, the primary international human
rights treaties include a derogation clause in relation to emergency situations. (Art.
15 ECHR; Art. 4 ICCPR, Art. 27 American Convention on Human Rights). To date
(2019), nine States who are parties to the ECHR have invoked the derogation
clause, and the number is more than thirty for those who are parties to the ICCPR.
A duly proclaimed emergency regime relieves States from certain obligations that
are laid down by their national laws and international human rights treaties, and
also diminishes the separation of power by having altered the functioning of state
organs. More precisely, the declaration of a state of emergency involves the transfer
of additional powers to the executive, to the detriment of the judiciary and the
legislative. Consequently, the most grave and systematic human rights violations
often occur during periods of an emergency regime. This was and is the case in
Turkey, after a state of emergency was declared by the Turkish Government on
20/07/2016, following a coup attempt by a small group in the Turkish Armed Forces.
On 20/07/2016, the Turkish Government declared a state of emergency for three
months, under Article 120 of the Turkish Constitution, and Article 3 of the Act on the
State of Emergency (No: 2935). The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TGNA),
approved the decision of the Council of Ministers on 21/07/2016. Both decisions
were duly published in the Official Gazette. On the very same day, in pursuance of
Article 15 ECHR and Article 4 ICCPR, the Turkish Government notified the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe and the Secretary-General of the United Nations
about derogations from the ECHR and the ICCPR.
This essay explains that although the Turkish Government observed procedural
rules laid down by national and international law on declaring a state of emergency,
its way to use emergency powers was not in compliance with national and
international law, as it contradicts non-derogable rights laid down in the Turkish
Constitution and the ICCPR and the ECHR which Turkey is party to.
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II. General Overview of Emergency Decrees (ED)
Adopted Between 21/07/2016 and 19/07/2018
Under Turkish law, the most significant consequence of declaring the state of
emergency is the empowerment of the Cabinet to adopt Decrees, which have the
force of law without the ex-ante authorization of the Parliament (TGNA). Pursuant to
article 121§3 of the Turkish Constitution, during the state of emergency, the Council
of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, may
issue Decrees with the force of law, on matters that are necessitated by a state of
emergency.
During the emergency rule (2016-2018), the Turkish Government enacted thirty-two
Emergency Decrees. Seventeen of those targeted certain real and legal persons,
and adopted permanent measures relating to them. With these Emergency Decrees,
125.678 individuals were dismissed from public service, more than 4,000 legal
persons (foundations, associations, universities, trade unions, private hospitals,
private schools, media outlets) were closed down.  The assets of all those legal
persons were transferred to the Treasury without cost, compensation and/or any
obligation or restriction (see, Art. 2 of EDs, Nos. 667-668; Arts. 5 and 10 of ED,
No. 670; Art. 3 of EDs, Nos. 677& 683). Besides the measures targeted at tens
of thousands of real and legal persons, Emergency Decrees led to over 1,000
permanent amendments to national laws.
III. The Measures Interfering in Absolute Rights
The Right to Life and the Prohibition of Torture
The right to life and the prohibition of torture are non-derogable under Article
15§2 of the Constitution, Article 4§2 ICCPR and Article 15§2 ECHR. However,
various impunity clauses which were introduced with the Emergency Decrees by
the Cabinet, have resulted in the de facto derogation from the right to life and the
prohibition of torture.
The very first Emergency Decree (no. 667, Art. 9§1) stipulated that “legal,
administrative, financial and criminal liabilities shall not arise in respect of the
persons who have adopted decisions and who fulfill their duties within the scope of
this Decree Law”. Emergency Decree no. 668 (Art. 37) has further expanded this
principle of impunity, specifying that there will be no criminal, legal, administrative
or financial responsibility for those making decisions, implementing actions or
measures, or assuming duties as per judiciary or administrative measures for
suppressing coup attempts or terror incidents, as well as individuals taking decisions
or fulfilling duties as per State of Emergency Executive Decrees. By Emergency
Decree no. 696 (Art. 121), the impunity provided to public servants under Emergency
Decrees nos. 667-668, was also extended to civilians. More precisely, it was
stipulated that those civilians acting to suppress the coup attempt of 15/7/2016
and the ensuing events will have no legal, administrative, financial or criminal
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responsibility. What is more, all these three decrees were approved by the TGNA
and have become ordinary laws (Law Nos. 6749, 6755 and 7079).
Under these provisions, public prosecutors have given non-prosecution decisions
on criminal complaints that were filed for alleged murder and torture incidents. The
Trabzon Prosecutorial Office thus gave a non-prosecution decision under Article 9 of
Emergency Decree no. 667 regarding a complaint filed by an alleged torture victim.
Likewise, the Istanbul Prosecutorial Office gave a non-prosecution decision on a
complaint that was filed by the family members of a military cadet who was tortured
and murdered by civilians during the coup attempt. Further to this, since the failed
coup attempt, wide-spread torture and ill-treatment incidents have been reported
in Turkey by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Human Rights Watch as well as many other credible
institutions. Last, but not least, since the enactment of Emergency Decree no. 667,
twenty-four enforced disappearance incidents have been reported in Turkey.
The right to life and the prohibition of torture impose a positive obligation on
State parties to the ECHR and ICCPR, as well as a negative one. The positive
obligation concerning the right to life requires the State parties to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of those under its jurisdiction, and to apply this in
the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be
at stake.  Likewise, the State parties are under the obligation to prevent torture
and ill-treatment. These obligations also require the carrying out of an effective
investigation when the right to life or the prohibition of torture has been breached.
The ECtHR has affirmed, in the case of Marguš v. Croatia, that:
“granting amnesty in respect of the killing and ill-treatment of civilians
would run contrary to the State’s obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of
the Convention, since it would hamper the investigation of such acts and
necessarily lead to impunity for those responsible.”
In conclusion, the impunity clauses introduced within the emergency measures,
and their interpretation and implementation by law enforcement forces, judges and
prosecutors, have resulted in a de facto derogation of the right to life, and to the
prohibition of torture, which is clearly illegal under the Constitution, the ICCPR and
the ECHR.
The Prohibition of Retroactive Punishment and the Principle of No Punishment
Without Law
The prohibition of retroactive punishment and the principle of no punishment without
law are non-derogable according to the Turkish Constitution (Arts. 38 and 15§2), the
ECHR (Arts. 7 and 15§2) and the ICCPR (Arts. 15 and 4§2).
Seventeen Emergency Decrees justified the measures that sanctioned both natural
and legal persons for:
(i) having ‘membership, affiliation, relation or connection to’ the ‘Fetullahist Terrorist
Organization (FETO/PDY), or
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(ii) having ‘membership of, affiliation, link or connection with terrorist organizations or
structures, formations or groups which have been established by the NSC to perform
activities against national security of the State’.
Turkish Laws criminalize only the membership of a terrorist organization (Art. 314,
Turkish Penal Code). That is to say, neither ‘affiliation, relation, link or connection’ to
a terrorist organization, nor ‘structures, formations or groups which perform activities
against the national security of the State’ are crimes under Turkish Law. Moreover,
the Law on the National Security Council (NSC) (Law no. 2945, Art. 3) does not
empower the NSC to designate a group as a terrorist organization, nor as a group
performing activities against the national security of the State. The authority to
designate an organization, a structure, a body, etc., as a terrorist organization, is
exclusively vested in the judiciary by Article 138 of the Constitution. And the final
judgment that characterizes the Gulen Structure as a terrorist organization was
rendered on 26/09/2017 (General Chamber of the Court of Cassation, Decision No:
2017/370). Moreover, even if it is assumed that the NSC has the authority to make
such a designation, it did not explicitly designate the Gulen Structure as a terrorist
organization until 20/07/2016.
One can argue that, under the Engel criteria , Article 7 ECHR does not cover the
dismissals under the Emergency Decrees. However, taking into consideration the
Matyjek v. Poland judgment, which established that the prohibition on practicing
certain professions for a long period of time should be regarded as having at least
a partly punitive character, Turkey’s Dismissal Decrees can be regarded as being
within the first limb of Article 7 ECHR. Furthermore, the High Election Board’s
decision (2019/2363, 10/04/2019) which prevents the dismissed public servants
from assuming elective offices, overlaps with the consequences of being convicted
under the Turkish Penal Code, and therefore a dismissal might be regarded as a
punishment rather than an administrative (preventive) measure.
In conclusion, considering that:
(i) Turkish laws do not criminalize the ‘affiliation, connection, relation and link’, but do
criminalize only membership to a terrorist organization,
(ii) the life-time ban for working in the public service that is sanctioned by the
Emergency Decrees, which may compromise private sector employment as well, can
be regarded as falling within the first limb of Article 7 ECHR,
(iii) until the 15/07/2016, coup attempt, the Turkish Government did not explicitly
mention the Gulen Structure as being a terrorist organization or a group performing
activities against the national security of the State, through official means,
(v) the final judgment that designates the Gulen Structure as a terrorist organization
was rendered on 26/09/2017,
(vi) the criteria used to determine ‘membership, affiliation, connection, relation and
link’ of the Gulen Structure, or to the group established by the NSC as performing
activities against the national security of the State, consists of either legitimate
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relations with legal persons that are incorporated or founded under Turkish law, or
intelligence reports,
(vii) Disciplinary liability, or any other similar measure, should be foreseeable; a
public servant should understand that he/she is doing something that is incompatible
with his/her status, in order to be disciplined for it,
it can be argued that Turkey’s Emergency Decrees that were enacted between 2016
and 2018 constitute a violation of the prohibition on retroactive punishment and the
principle of no punishment without law, which are non-derogable under the ECHR,
the ICCPR and the Constitution of Turkey.
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